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The general aim of public policies toward disability is to share and 
to contain the associated social cost. Each country develops its own 
response with respect to disability. National policies typically are a 
mixture of three main objectives: (1) to ease the burden of impairments 
and the loss of earning capacity, which Haveman, Halberstadt, and 
Burkhauser (1984) call the ameliorative policy response; (2) to recover 
the earning capacity and the ability to perform normal social functions, 
so-called corrective policies; and (3) to prevent the occurrence of 
health impairments and to promote swift restoration of capacities if 
impairments prove to be irreversible, e.g., by adapting job demands or 
job conditions, which is the preventive approach.
In this paper, we discuss European experiences with disability pol 
icy over the last decades and current trends. We do so by presenting 
four typical national policies, from the Netherlands, Sweden, West 
Germany, and the United Kingdom. Each of these puts different 
emphases on compensation levels, on the linkage of ameliorative with 
corrective approaches, and on employment opportunities for disabled 
workers. 1 We start by tracking the disability records of the United 
States in comparison with the other four countries indicated and illus 
trate how different policy mixtures result in different outcomes. Next, 
we discuss how these various policy outcomes relate to cross-national 
approaches to disability insurance and to rehabilitation. We then focus 
on incentive structures as defined by the design and administration of 
disability programs and by their broader socioeconomic and policy 
environment. In the concluding section, we draw some lessons from
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other nations' experiences that may be relevant for redesigning U.S. 
disability policy.
Cross-National Comparison of Disability Records
Over the past two decades, virtually all Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries have been con 
fronted with excess supplies of labor resulting from demographics (the 
influx of baby boomers) and changed tastes for market work (the 
increasing participation of married women). Most of these countries 
have seen substantial declines in older male labor force participation as 
well as considerable increases in the availability and generosity of dis 
ability, and other early retirement, benefits. The concurrence of these 
tendencies suggests that disability programs have been generally used 
to achieve more general social policy goals, such as low (youth) unem 
ployment.
In their comprehensive cross-national study of disability policy, 
Haveman, Halberstadt, and Burkhauser (1984) attribute the generally 
observed growth of disability income support to faltering economic 
growth. According to them, it made older workers with more or less 
serious impairments targets for layoffs while reducing their opportuni 
ties to obtain a job if out of work. In response, eligibility criteria for 
disability were relaxed. The disability option was attractive to older 
workers, as benefit payments became increasingly more adequate, and 
relatively little stigma was attached to the receipt of disability transfer 
income. Employers, likewise, found this development attractive, as it 
made release of long-term older, low-skilled, or impaired workers less 
difficult. With large cohorts of better-educated youths and women 
entering the labor market, replacement of older workers was not diffi 
cult. Disability income support programs became an instrument to 
encourage early retirement.
To the extent that this scenario holds for most Western countries, 
disability policy, at least in the 1970s, has emphasized income support 
rather than rehabilitation. A closer comparison of five countries (table 
1), however, reveals that the age-specific trends in the number of dis 
ability beneficiaries show significant cross-national differences. To
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contain unemployment, the Netherlands clearly chose the income 
maintenance option, even for those under 45. Sweden and Germany, on 
the other hand, largely opted for employment security for ailing work 
ers under 60 and restoration of their earning capacities where possible. 
Part of the German excess labor supply was captured by relaxing bene 
fit eligibility criteria, both for disabled and able-bodied workers over 
60. The United States initially showed a tendency towards the income 
maintenance option but started to tighten eligibility standards at the 
end of the 1970s. Considering the full 1970-1990 period, the United 
States accommodated an excess supply of labor by letting wage rates 
drop and allowing market forces to create low-productivity employ 
ment for impaired workers. After 1990, however, disability transfer 
recipiency shows a steep increase (for a short description, see U.S. 
General Accounting Office 1994).
Like the United States, Germany introduced stricter eligibility stan 
dards in 1985, which brought the relative size of the 1990 beneficiary 
volume back to the low level that had prevailed in the 1970s. Note also 
that the German prevalence rates for younger workers were relatively 
low over the whole period, and lower in 1990 than in 1970. This sug 
gests that by making older workers redundant, younger workers' 
employment could be secured. Finally, the United Kingdom has seen 
disability growth in all age brackets but, contrary to the other countries, 
only after 1980.
The data in table 1 highlight the unique position of the Netherlands. 
For those younger than 60, disability prevalence rates have been about 
three times as high as in other countries (Aarts, Burkhauser, and de 
long 1996). Furthermore, the average Dutch beneficiary age is 49, 
which compares to 57 in Sweden and Germany. As one can plausibly 
assume that the Dutch do not have significantly poorer health status 
and job conditions than other European populations, the difference 
must be sought in the way disability benefits are being allocated.
Table 1 also shows that, despite having a disability beneficiary vol 
ume which is two-to-three times as large as that in comparable welfare 
states, the Dutch unemployment rate is at about the OECD average 
level. As a consequence, the employment rate, i.e., employed persons 
as a percentage of the working-age population, is low, especially 
among older workers (see OECD 1993). These data on the Dutch labor 
market suggest that other comparable countries have a stronger capac 
ity to reintegrate, or keep, less productive individuals in the workforce.
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Table 1. Disability Transfer Recipients per Thousand Active Labor Force 
Participants by Age, Unemployment Rates, and Older Male 
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Table 1. Disability Transfer Recipients per Thousand Active Labor Force 
Participants by Age, Unemployment Rates, and Older Male 



















































SOURCE: United Kingdom age-specific data are denved from Lonsdale (1993) and Employment
Gazette (several issues), UK disability beneficiary data for 1993 or 1994 were not available.;
other data are updates from Aarts, Burkhauser, and de Jong (1992).
a German data refer to the former Federal Republic.
b Figure refers to 1993
c Figure refers to 1971
d. Figure refers to 1991.
Table 2 provides data on "active," or corrective (vocational rehabili 
tation, work for the disabled), versus "passive," or ameliorative (dis 
ability benefits), program expenditures. Of the countries listed, Sweden 
and Holland devote by far the largest shares of their national resources 
to both types of disability policies. In these countries, the largest parts 
of redeployment budgets are used to create jobs outside of the market. 
While in Sweden only a minority of this budget is allocated to shel 
tered workshops (see "Cross-National Comparison of Rehabilitation 
Policies" on p. 141), in Holland, the entire budget is used to keep dis 
abled workers who want jobs out of regular employment. Recent 
changes in Dutch disability insurance legislation seek to reduce dis 
ability benefit dependency and to keep people with disabilities in paid 
work. The Dutch figures for 1993 suggest that these amendments were 
unsuccessful; however, the disability volume decreased in 1994, for the 
first time in an almost 30-year history of relentless growth.
The low U.S. spending on disability as a percentage of Gross 
Domestic Product suggests that this section relies more than do West 
ern European countries on policies that induce impaired persons to
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seek private solutions for their employment problems. Germany stands 
out as a country that emphasizes rehabilitation and spends a moderate 
proportion on cash benefits, mainly on older workers.
The costs involved with private solutions to the employment prob 
lems faced by the disabled depend on regulations such as employment 
quotas, job protection, and equal opportunity legislation. These types 
of costs are mainly borne by the employer. Moreover, countries with 
stringent award policies and low benefit levels shift a larger part of the 
social cost of disability to the household budgets of people with dis 
abilities. National policies, therefore, not only determine the level of 
the total, social cost of disability, but also the way in which this cost is 
shared between the private and public sectors. Countries with compar 
atively tight budgets for cash benefits are likely to have relatively low 
social costs, e.g., efficiency losses, and a relatively large share of pri 
vate costs (to employers and households).
Table 2. Public Expenditures on Labor Market Measures for the




























SOURCE- OECD (1992, 1993), Sociale Nota (1993), and authors' calculations 
a Less than 0.01 percent.
Cross-National Comparison of Disability Benefit Policies
In this section, we describe several aspects of disability policies as 
elements of a broader set of income maintenance and labor market pro 
grams. We start with an outline of common features of selected social
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security systems and their divergent underlying philosophies. Specific 
approaches toward disabled citizens are reflected primarily by differ 
ences in the accessibility, generosity, and administration of disability 
transfer programs. The main characteristics of such programs will be 
discussed and are summarized in an appendix table. Also important is 
the broader institutional setting, in which the availability of alternative 
transfers and the scope of rehabilitation and redeployment programs 
are crucial elements. At the beginning, and at the end of this section, 
we therefore devote a few paragraphs to more general aspects of social 
policy.
Common Features: Social Insurance and Welfare Provisions
European social security systems include both social insurance and 
social assistance (welfare) programs. Social insurance flows from the 
vision of Bismark, the German politician who, in the second half of the 
19th century, introduced the first legally established insurance funds to 
cover work injuries. Other types of social insurance, covering wage 
loss due to temporary sickness, nonwork-related invalidity, old age, 
and unemployment, followed.
Welfare programs germinated from ideas in the Atlantic Charter, 
drafted by Churchill and Roosevelt in 1941. This document offered a 
blueprint for the postwar Keynesian welfare state, which rested on the 
twin principles of "freedom from want" and "freedom from idleness." 
For the United Kingdom, this blueprint was elaborated by Beveridge, 
who proposed a national safety net to protect every citizen against pov 
erty.
Both types of programs are based on the principle of solidarity and 
on its legal counterpart, the constitutionally established responsibility 
of the state to protect its residents from poverty. This goal is achieved 
by two provisions: wage-replacement and minimum income guaran 
tees. Wage-replacement is based on mutual, and intergenerational, soli 
darity among employees to protect their acquired standards of living. 
Wage-replacing schemes consist of social insurance covering the loss 
of earnings due to old age, unemployment, temporary sickness, or per 
manent disability. Social insurance expenditures are financed by com 
pulsory contributions, and the premiums are determined under a pay- 
as-you-go system.
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Social assistance programs safeguard the subsistence levels of all 
residents by offering flat-rate, means-tested transfers financed by gen 
eral revenue and administered by municipalities or local agencies. Stat 
utory, or collectively bargained, minimum wages are intended to 
protect the livelihood of those who are employed.
Finally, in the European welfare states people have broad access to 
health care through combinations of public, tax-funded programs, 
social insurance, and/or regulated private markets. Such arrangements 
are of prime interest for people with disabilities.
Comparison of these general features of European welfare states 
with the United States reveals four major differences. First, the United 
States has no universal safety net provision for those, working or non- 
working, below the poverty line. Second, contrary to European sys 
tems, temporary sickness is not covered by a statutory sick pay plan 
that encompasses all those in paid employment. Third, Americans are 
not universally (or federally) insured against loss of earnings due to 
unemployment. Fourth, despite the existence of two public, federal 
programs that cover health costs for target groups (Medicare and Med- 
icaid), universal coverage is not available.
Underlying Philosophies
The common features of European social security systems only 
indicate the broad principles on which they are based. However, as the 
data in the two preceding tables suggest, the countries surveyed here 
differ significantly in their treatment of people with disabilities. These 
approaches are related to varying perspectives on the disabled and 
translate into cross-national differences in disability policies and policy 
outcomes.
Considering the 1970-1990 period, Holland is an exceptional case 
by its emphasis on "freedom from want" at the expense of "freedom 
from idleness," which is the overriding principle in Sweden, the United 
Kingdom, and Germany. Until 1990, when the Swedish economy 
slipped into its deepest crisis since World War II, the Swedes gave pri 
ority to vocational rehabilitation and redeployment of the disabled, 
mostly through public sector work programs. Since then, job programs 
have been cut, and unemployment has soared. Nevertheless, swift reha 
bilitation is still a major goal. Sweden also stresses moderation of
Disability, Work and Cash Benefits 137
income differentials so that both benefit replacement rates and public 
sector wages are comparatively high and independent of job perfor 
mance.
Despite sharp differences in disability policy and records, Holland 
and Sweden share the economic problems attributable to a wasteful 
welfare state. Both countries are now reevaluating their social systems, 
to strike more of a balance between equity and efficiency. One of the 
focal points of this process is the incentive structure in which relevant 
parties (covered workers, employers, program administrators) operate 
(see the section entitled "The Importance of Incentive Structures").
In comparison to those in Holland and Sweden, the German system 
appears to be more manageable. Rehabilitation bevor Renten (rehabili 
tation before pensions) is the often-quoted leading principle of German 
disability policy and of social policy in general. It implies a public 
commitment to give priority to preventive and corrective policy 
responses. Strict admission procedures, mandatory rehabilitation, a 
quota for employers to provide (market) jobs for the disabled, and a 
separate disabled worker status in employment are the main instru 
ments to support vocational rehabilitation.
Finally, the United Kingdom contains its disability budget mainly 
by keeping benefit levels low. Vocational rehabilitation is supported by 
a set of instruments similar to that in Germany. However, these tools 
are less effective, as the involvement of employers in shaping and 
administering social insurance programs is weaker than on the Euro 
pean continent, where the concept of a "social partnership" between 
labor and management has strong traditional roots and pervades the 
institutional framework in which the labor market operates.
Accessibility I: Coverage2
In European welfare states, all employees are covered by social 
insurance against the risk of wage loss due to temporary sickness or 
permanent disablement. Sick pay usually covers all health contingen 
cies, whether objectively assessable or not. If the incapacity has a 
work-related cause, a separate work injury program may replace wage 
loss. European work injury plans are similar to the U.S. workers' com 
pensation program, both in design and origin. Work injury programs 
were the first form of social insurance in all early market economies.
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As a consequence of the Industrial Revolution, a large number of indi 
viduals became involved in hazardous jobs. Simultaneously, tort law 
evolved such that employers were increasingly found liable for the 
financial consequences of job-related diseases and injuries. These par 
allel trends spurred a common interest among labor and firms in cover 
age of the financial risks of work injury. As private insurance markets 
were unable to provide such coverage, this common interest created a 
broad political platform for the implementation of statutory social 
insurance plans.
In almost all welfare states, coverage of work injury and related 
risks is compulsory for private employment. One of the exceptions is 
Holland, which abolished the distinction between work-related and 
other causes of incapacity under its disability insurance scheme in 
1967. In the United States, small firms, and firms in certain states, may 
be exempted from mandated coverage. 3
Most disability transfer programs covering social risks, i.e., non- 
work-related contingencies, consist of an employment-related, social 
insurance scheme, like the Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) 
program, and a separate arrangement for disabled persons without, or 
with limited, work experience, like Supplemental Security Income 
(SSI). In Holland and Sweden, compensation for loss of earning capac 
ity due to long-term impairments is provided by a two-tier disability 
insurance program. The first tier is universal, with eligibility being 
based on citizenship. These national disability insurance programs typ 
ically offer flat-rate benefits that are, of course, earnings-tested but are 
not tested for other household means. They target those handicapped 
congenitally, or in early childhood, and provide benefits from age 18 
onwards. In Holland, these basic benefits also cover self-employed 
people. In Germany and the United Kingdom, those with insufficient 
insurance contribution years have to rely on means-tested social assis 
tance transfers. In the United Kingdom, an additional disability pre 
mium may be allowed up to the basic rate under invalidity benefits (see 
the appendix table). In Germany, employees who become disabled 
before age 55 enjoy entitlements as if they had worked until age 55.
Eligibility for a supplement is restricted to labor force participants. 
These second-tier benefits are based on age, or employment history, 
and wage earnings. In Germany and Sweden, as is the case under the 
U.S. Social Security system, earnings-related disability insurance is
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part of the legal pension system. Coverage depends on contribution 
years. More specifically, at least three years (Sweden) or three out of 
the five years (Germany) preceding a contingency should have been 
spent in paid employment. Wage earners are obliged to participate, and 
the self-employed may participate voluntarily. Holland and the United 
Kingdom have no contribution requirements for earnings-related bene 
fits in terms of years of covered employment. However, the United 
Kingdom has a requirement of covered earnings both for statutory sick 
pay and invalidity benefits, and, in 1993, Holland introduced a system 
of age-dependent supplemental benefits, which simulate a contribution 
years requirement.
Accessibility II: Eligibility Requirements and Benefit Levels
By definition, eligibility for disability pensions is based on some 
measure of (residual) capacity or productivity. The United Kingdom 
has an all-or-nothing system: after 28 weeks, when sickness benefits 
have run out, only those fully incapacitated, i.e., more than 80 percent 
disabled, qualify for invalidity benefits. These are basically flat-rate 
benefits, which are only distantly related to previous earnings (see the 
appendix table). Supplements and allowances may be given, depending 
(inversely) on age and on household situation.
Germany has a dual system, with full benefits for those who lose 
two-thirds or more of their earning capacity with regard to any job 
available in the economy and partial benefits for those who are more 
than 50 percent disabled with regard to their usual occupation. Under 
the Handicapped Act of 1974, workers having a permanent reduction 
in their labor capacity of at least 50 percent are entitled to the status of 
"severely disabled" (Schwerbehinderte). Given this status, workers are 
entitled to extra vacation and enjoy protection against dismissal. 
Although being recognized as a severely disabled worker does not give 
access to cash benefits, it allows one to retire at age 60 with a full pen 
sion, given sufficient (15) contribution years.4
Sweden has a more lenient eligibility standard, as incapacity is mea 
sured with regard to commensurate employment instead of any gainful 
activity. Moreover, the Swedish program has four disability categories, 
depending on the size of residual capacity, with a corresponding sys 
tem of full and partial pensions.
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The Dutch disability program is unique in that it distinguishes seven 
disability categories, ranging from less-than-15 percent, 15-25 percent 
disabled, and so on, to 80-100 percent disabled. The minimum degree 
of disability yielding entitlement to benefits is 15 percent. The degree 
of disablement is assessed by consideration of the worker's residual 
earning capacity. As of 1994, capacity is defined by the earnings flow 
ing from any job commensurate with one's residual capabilities as a 
percentage of predisability usual earnings. The degree of disablement, 
then, is the complement of the residual earning capacity and defines 
the benefit level. Before 1994, only jobs that were compatible with 
one's training and work history could be taken into consideration. Not 
only has the definition of suitable work been broadened, but the medi 
cal definition of disability has been tightened: under the new ruling, the 
causal relationship between impairment and disablement has to be 
objectively assessable.
Administration
The preceding short overview of "the rules of the game" does not 
say much about how the game is played. It does not explain why differ 
ent national schemes produce the divergent results recorded by tables 1 
and 2. More specifically, the fact that Holland has such a high preva 
lence of disability transfer payment recipients has more to do with the 
way in which the rules are applied than with the rules as such.
The Dutch disability plan differs from other national programs, not 
only because it has no separate work injury scheme and has a more 
elaborate system of partial benefits, but also because its social insur 
ance programs (disability and unemployment insurance, and sickness 
benefits) are run by autonomous organizations, which lack direct gov 
ernmental (political) control. These "Industrial (Insurance) Associa 
tions" represent different (19) branches of industry. They are managed 
by representatives of employers' organizations and trade unions. Mem 
bership in one of these associations is obligatory for every employer. 
The Industrial Associations have discretion to develop autonomous 
benefit award and rehabilitation policies without having to bear the fis 
cal consequences of their policy choices, as disability program expen 
ditures are funded by a uniform contribution rate. Thus, administrative 
autonomy is not balanced by financial responsibility (see the discus 
sion under "The Importance of Incentive Structures").
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In Germany and Sweden, disability insurance is part of the national 
pension program, which is run by an independent, national board that 
is, however, closely supervised by those who are politically responsible 
for the operation of the social security system and therefore subject to 
parliamentary control. These boards monitor disability plans and safe 
guard uniformity in award policy by issuing rules and guidelines to 
local agencies. The British administration, being a civil service run by 
the Department of Social Security, is more similar to the U.S. Social 
Security Administration. The difference between these countries and 
Holland, then, is that their disability systems are under some form of 
budgetary control.
In Holland, disability assessments are made by teams of insurance 
doctors and vocational experts employed by the administrative offices 
of the Industrial Associations. These teams also have to examine the 
rehabilitation potential of disability claimants and to rehabilitate those 
with sufficient residual capacities. A further potentially important dif 
ference with the other European countries, then, is that the Dutch dis 
ability assessment teams are legally obliged to examine every benefit 
claimant personally, not just administratively. This may have spurred a 
liberal, conflict-avoiding attitude, especially in a setting in which nei 
ther the gatekeepers themselves nor their managers are confronted with 
the financial consequences of award decisions.
Sweden only allows administrative checks of disability claims on 
the basis of written, medical and other, reports in order to prevent the 
program gatekeepers from being influenced by self-reports and by the 
physical presence of claimants. In Germany, too, award decisions are 
made by using medical reports and by applying uniform decision rules 
developed by specialists' panels, each covering a diagnostic group. 
Entry into the British Invalidity Benefit program rests upon the claim 
ant's doctor issuing a statement that advises the person to refrain from 
work when, in the doctor's opinion, the patient is definitely unable to 
do so because of a physical or mental disorder or when work would be 
detrimental to the patient's health. Claimants may be, and often are, 
referred to doctors of the Benefit Agency's Medical Reference Ser 
vices. Usually, one in three among those examined by reference doc 
tors is considered fit for either the predisability job or for some other 
work.
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"Hidden" Unemployment
Workers with disabilities have a higher-than-average sensitivity to 
cyclical downswings. Independent of the operation of disability pro 
grams, they are among the first to be made redundant. Both American 
and British studies show a significant relationship between labor mar 
ket conditions and disability program participation rates. 5 These stud 
ies do not explain the extent to which there may be severely disabled 
individuals hidden among workers in boom periods or (mildly dis 
abled) unemployed persons hidden among disability benefit recipients 
in slack periods.
As discussed, European workers who lose their jobs are usually cov 
ered by unemployment insurance. Entitlement to earnings-related 
unemployment insurance benefits is of limited duration and is followed 
by flat-rate, means-tested social assistance. In Holland, Germany, and 
Sweden, entitlement durations depend on age, such that workers older 
than 58 or 60 may keep unemployment insurance until they reach pen 
sionable age (65) or qualify for disability insurance benefits on non- 
medical, labor market grounds. Improper use of disability benefits as a 
more generous, and less stigmatizing, alternative to unemployment 
benefits was quite common in the 1975-1990 period (see the earlier 
section on disability records). It provided employers with a flexible 
instrument to reduce the labor force at will and kept official unemploy 
ment rates low. The approach was very popular in Sweden until 1992, 
when the law was changed and disability pensions based solely on 
unemployment could no longer be awarded.
Holland had similar experiences. Until 1987, the law explicitly rec 
ognized the difficulties impaired workers may have in finding com 
mensurate employment by prescribing that the benefit adjudicators 
should take account of poor labor market opportunities. The adminis 
trative interpretation of this so-called labor market consideration was 
so liberal as to award a full benefit to almost anyone who passed the 
low threshold of a 15 percent reduction in earnings capacity. The share 
of unemployed (or "socially disabled") among disability insurance 
beneficiaries, applying the pre-1994 eligibility standards, is estimated 
to be 40 percent (see Aarts and de long 1992, chapters 5 and 11). The 
fact that the abolition of this legal provision could not halt the growth
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in the incidence of disability transfer payment recipients (table 1) 
induced further amendments in 1992-1994.
Labor market considerations also influence disability determinations 
in Germany. In 1976, the German Federal Court ruled that if insured 
persons have limited residual capacities and the Employment Service 
or the Pension Insurance is unable to find them a commensurate job 
within one year, they can be awarded a full disability pension retroac 
tively. Because partial disability benefits are based on the availability 
of commensurate work, certified skilled workers may refuse any job 
that is not at least semiskilled in nature. A semiskilled worker must 
only accept unskilled jobs that are prominent in pay and prestige. 
Unskilled workers who are not eligible for a full disability pension 
have to resort to unemployment or to social assistance. These regula 
tions, in combination with a slack labor market, have reduced the pro 
portion of partial pensions from 30 percent in 1970 to less than 5 
percent in the early 1990s.
Cross-National Comparison of Rehabilitation Policies
Assessment of rehabilitative potential is the counterpart of disability 
assessment. To contain dependency on transfer payments, impairments 
should be cured, or their limiting consequences corrected, as soon as 
possible. The ultimate goal of a vocational rehabilitation plan is work 
resumption. This involves more than treatment, training, and the provi 
sion of corrective devices. It also involves job mediators and employ 
ers. Swift rehabilitation and redeployment depend on the willingness 
of all of these different actors to invest money, time, and/or effort to 
boost the employment possibilities of impaired workers. The job of 
some of these participants (doctors, ergonomists, job mediators) is to 
help people overcome their handicaps. For others, the impaired work 
ers and their employers, it is more or less a matter of choice and, hence, 
of incentives, as to whether they engage in rehabilitative efforts.
Policies differ with respect to public spending on rehabilitation ser 
vices and on employment programs for disabled workers (see table 2). 
Rehabilitation services may consist of (subsidies on) tangible provi 
sions (corrective devices, such as wheelchairs, workplace accommoda-
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tions, Seeing Eye dogs) or of intangible ones (training, therapy, 
counseling, job mediation). Given the broad accessibility of health care 
in European welfare states, there are no serious financial impediments 
to obtaining medical rehabilitation. Nevertheless, over the past years, 
as part of the changes in their welfare programs, Sweden and Holland 
have introduced patient fees for an increasing number of health and 
rehabilitation services.
National policies also differ in the extent to which they require reha 
bilitation efforts. Mandatory rehabilitation is a possible outcome of the 
disability determination process in both Germany and Sweden. More 
over, Germany and the United Kingdom have quotas, stipulating that 
firms should employ a certain percentage of workers who are registered 
as handicapped. Dutch and Swedish civil law similar to the Americans 
with Disabilities Act requires firms to provide commensurate work to 
employees who have become disabled in their current jobs.
Public Provision of Rehabilitation Services
In addition to cash compensation, Dutch disability insurance offers 
in-kind provisions covering job accommodation and training costs to 
promote redeployment of impaired workers. As table 2 indicates, 
spending in this area is minimal. In 1993, spending on provisions in 
kind under the Dutch disability insurance program amounted to 0.8 bil 
lion guilders. Only 20 million (2.5 percent of provisions expenditures, 
about 0.1 percent of total disability expenditures) was used for voca 
tional rehabilitation and workplace adjustment. The rest was spent on 
provisions for general daily activities (mobility, dwelling, etc.). The 
amount is extremely low simply because very few claims are filed. On 
a per-capita basis, Germany spends 42 times more than Holland does 
on vocational rehabilitation.6
Various aspects of the disability pension system reflect the German 
commitment to a corrective policy response. First, a relatively large 
amount of money is spent on vocational rehabilitation (see table 2). 
Impaired workers are referred to rehabilitation by the adjudicators of 
either the sickness insurance system, the disability pensions, or by the 
local employment agencies. Furthermore, to encourage employment of 
disabled workers, the Handicapped Act subsidizes employer expenses 
related to job accommodations.
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The Swedish Social Security Administration and its regional and 
local offices do not have their own rehabilitation personnel or facilities. 
Instead, they enlist the services of the various medical, vocational, and 
other professionals in this field. Each county has AMIs (labor market 
institutes), special centers for vocational rehabilitation and guidance. 
The centers are operated by the National Labor Market Board through 
the county labor market boards. Some of them specialize in groups 
with specific disabilities. The AMIs provide more detailed examina 
tions than are given at the employment offices, in order to determine 
the work capacity of people with disabilities and to provide general 
help in developing the capacities necessary to work. However, in most 
cases, specific occupational training for the disabled is provided under 
the same programs that train people without disabilities. The AMIs 
also serve the nondisabled; the share of those in AMI programs who 
are able-bodied has gradually increased and is now about 50 percent.
Recently, the general policy emphasis in Sweden has been put on 
early intervention for those receiving sickness benefits and on the coor 
dination of all the parties involved in rehabilitation, i.e., medical pro 
fessionals, unions, employers, vocational professionals, and 
employment service administrators, depending on what the case is 
judged to require. New legislation gives the social insurance offices the 
responsibility for initiating and coordinating rehabilitation when nec 
essary. This has enabled social insurance administrators to act more as 
private insurers with a responsibility to contain costs. The government 
has established cost-reduction goals for all the regional offices regard 
ing sickness and disability payments. In sum, the trend of recent years 
has been to make more resources available for rehabilitation, while at 
the same time goals have been set for reducing benefit payments by 
returning persons to the workplace.
The British Department of Employment, operating under the 
responsibility of the Secretary of State for Employment, administers a 
number of programs aimed at rehabilitation and reentry into the labor 
market. The United Kingdom provides a status to those who qualify to 
be registered as disabled similar to the official status of Schwerbe- 
hinderte in Germany. Being on the register enables a person to claim 
various kinds of assistance aimed at getting a job.
Vocational rehabilitation is provided mainly through 26 Employ 
ment Rehabilitation Centres (ERCs). The ERC staff includes individu-
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als such as psychologists, social workers, and technical instructors, 
who provide fuller assessments of capacity as well as employment 
rehabilitation and training. Research in 1980 showed that, six months 
after completing the courses, about half the participants were 
employed and the other 50 percent were either on sickness benefits or 
unemployed. To our knowledge, more recent empirical analyses are 
not available. The present trend is towards privatizing the Employment 
Rehabilitation Centers.
Employment Policies
Provision of jobs for workers with disabilities can take several 
forms. One is job creation in the public sector, either as part of an 
employment policy targeted at a broader population, including the 
able-bodied unemployed, or via a narrow approach, by creating shel 
tered workshops as a kind of workfare for the disabled. Another way to 
promote employment is to hand out wage subsidies to private business. 
Finally, employers may be forced to make room for handicapped work 
ers by regulations, such as requirements involving special perks for 
recognized disabled workers, job protection, and employment quotas.
Sheltered Work. Holland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom have 
forms of sheltered work for the disabled. Holland has a national net 
work of sheltered workshops, employing 88,000 people with disabili 
ties (1.5 percent of total employment). Sweden has 35,000 
handicapped workers (0.83 percent of total employment) in sheltered 
jobs. In both countries, the operating costs of these workshops are 
almost fully funded by government. On average, wages are higher than 
disability benefits, and part-time earnings may be combined with par 
tial benefits. Handicapped workers may choose freely whether or not 
they want to be employed in a sheltered workshop. In the United King 
dom, the range of sheltered employment opportunities goes from large 
government-supported companies to smaller sheltered workshops that 
are little more than welfare provision. They all are heavily subsidized 
by way of grants to cover trading losses and training fees. Quantita 
tively, the sheltered employment programs are of marginal signifi 
cance, as only about 20,000 severely disabled people (0.075 percent of 
total employment) are in sheltered employment. Sheltered placements 
are increasing, however.
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Wage Subsidies and Partial Benefits. Apart from being an insurance 
device to compensate the exact loss of earning capacity, partial benefits 
also work as a wage subsidy. In fact, introduction of the fine grid of 
seven disability categories under Dutch disability insurance was sup 
ported by explicitly referring to its rehabilitative aims when the pro 
gram was enacted in 1967. Partial benefits were intended to help 
disabled workers find commensurate employment. By liberal applica 
tion of labor market considerations, it became routine to award full 
benefits under the presumption of a shortage of employment opportu 
nities. This lenient approach was hoped to have been changed by the 
1987 amendments, banning labor considerations, into an administra 
tive practice of accurate assessments of residual capacities. The old 
routines proved difficult to alter, however, and the amendments did not 
produce the expected results. At the end of 1993, 77 percent of current 
disability beneficiaries still had an award based on full disability. 
Hence, a new series of cuts and changes were introduced in 1993 and 
1994.
Like Holland, Sweden and Germany have also seen a growing share 
of full disability benefits. Currently, 85 percent of Swedish and 95 per 
cent of German beneficiaries (up from a 1965 low of 67 percent) are 
labeled as fully disabled. These differences suggest that the more strin 
gent the award system, the stronger the pressure to obtain full awards. 
In Sweden, a separate wage subsidy program was introduced in 1980, 
replacing two earlier programs. The compensation rate paid to the 
employer varies depending on the disability, on the duration of 
employment (compensation is generally higher in the first years after a 
person is hired; subsidies are not available for already employed per 
sons), on the sector in which the person is employed, and on the per 
son's age (compensation is highest for disabled youth). On average, the 
compensation rate was 73 percent in July 1992 for those in their first 
year of support and 61 percent for those assisted for longer periods. 
These wage subsidies are used by about 1 percent of total employment.
Although the British system does not provide for partial disability 
benefits, people with severe disabilities are subsidized under the Brit 
ish Sheltered Placement Scheme to work in the open labor market. The 
wage subsidies are paid to the employers to compensate for the differ 
ence in productivity between a disabled and a nondisabled worker. Fur 
thermore, the Disability Working Allowance, a bonus for disability
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beneficiaries who have found a job, was introduced in 1992. The allow 
ance depends on the wage and on the disabled person's wealth. Claims 
are adjudicated on the basis of self-assessed disability. The Department 
of Social Security anticipated an annual number of 50,000 claims. 
Within six months following its introduction, around 20,000 claims 
were received; however, 90 percent were denied, mainly because 
claimants had not yet obtained a job.
Employer Mandates
Quotas. Employment quotas exist in Germany and the United King 
dom. The German Handicapped Act requires that public and private 
employers with more than 15 employees hire one severely disabled 
person for every 16 job slots or pay monthly compensation of deutsche 
mark (DM) 200 ($130) for each unfilled quota position. In 1990, 
approximately 900,000 severely disabled persons were employed, and 
120,000 were unemployed. Despite the carrot of subsidies for work 
place adjustments and the stick of monthly fines, disabled persons 
make up only 4.5 percent of the targeted workforce, well below the 6 
percent quota. Only 19 percent of the 122,807 public and private 
employers subject to the quota have managed to fill it; 44 percent of 
these enterprises employ some severely disabled persons, although the 
numbers are lower than required by the Handicapped Act. The remain 
ing 37 percent employ no disabled persons (Sadowski and Frick 
1992a). Although German authors are rather critical of the effect of the 
Handicapped Act and compliance is far from full, the employment rate 
among disabled workers in the market sector is high by international 
standards, even by comparison with Sweden.
The British Disabled Persons Act of 1944 places a statutory obliga 
tion on employers with 20 or more employees to fulfill a "quota" of at 
least 3 percent of registered disabled people in the workforce. In the 
ory, noncompliance can lead to a fine or even to imprisonment. In prac 
tice, however, the quota regulation is not enforced. Fines have been 
imposed on only a handful of occasions despite the fact that, for the 
past 20 years, the majority of employers have stayed well below their 
quota requirements. In Holland, successive governments have also 
been reluctant to regulate business in this way, preferring to rely on the 
promotion of voluntary codes of practice.
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Job Protection. Dutch legal regulations oblige employers to provide 
commensurate work to employees who have become disabled in their 
current jobs. After the onset of impairment, individuals can only be 
dismissed if continued employment in one's usual, or alternative, work 
would put a more-than-reasonable strain upon the employer. An abso 
lute dismissal ban is in force during the first two years of disability. 
After these two years, the employer is usually granted dismissal per 
mission. Similarly, German workers that are recognized as severely 
disabled have the right to demand workplace adjustments and to enjoy 
protection against dismissal.
The Importance of Incentive Structures
Overview
European welfare states are in a phase of reorientation. The negative 
efficiency impacts of the equity principles upon which these states 
were built have gradually turned into urgent social policy problems. In 
countries such as Holland and Sweden, the sentiment is that
far too many people rely on social benefits, while too few citizens 
are at work contributing to economic growth and the financing of 
social welfare expenditure. The benefit rules and the high levels of 
taxation required to finance the system affect human motivation in 
a negative direction and may increase the propensity to work 
unofficially in the "black" economy.7
Among other things, the generosity and lack of control of disability 
benefit programs are now important entries on the agenda for reform. 
As we have seen, Germany and the United Kingdom have less gener 
ous and, therefore, more manageable disability programs.
Among the four countries studied, Germany probably shows the 
best example of a balanced approach toward disability in that it is the 
least controversial. However, national policies have their own historical 
background and are set in a specific political and socioeconomic con 
text. An exact copy of the German system in another national setting 
could, therefore, yield very different results. What we can learn from 
varying experiences in different settings is something about the com-
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bined effects of, and possible relationships between, disability policies 
and their social, economic, and political environment.
Every country develops its own set of policy responses, which are 
typically mixtures of ameliorative, corrective, and preventive elements. 
More specifically, disability policies are directed at four goals, namely, 
(1) prevention of, (2) compensation for, and (3) recovery from losses in 
earning capacity due to functional limitations, and (4) reduction in the 
waste of human capital, by either retaining people with residual earn 
ing capacities within the employing firm or by gainful redeployment 
through external channels.
In practice, the second and fourth goals often are in conflict. Since 
adequate compensation may collide with the need to contain benefit 
expenditures, each national system has to find a balance by setting pri 
orities and by using a number of instruments that are more or less uni 
versal across countries, such as
• social insurance benefits;
• assessment instruments and procedures that help in targeting bene 
fits to the most needy and that facilitate timely interventions;
•rehabilitation services (training, medical services) and other in- 
kind provisions to accommodate functional limitations;
•redeployment services (job mediation), sheltered employment 
opportunities for those who are not employable in regular jobs, and 
quotas;
•legal provisions aimed at reducing the risk of work injury and 
occupational diseases;
• legal employment protection of functionally impaired people to 
counterbalance their reduced "market value"; and
• wage subsidies, partial benefits, or disability allowances to com 
pensate employees/employers for productivity losses.
Under the European systems reviewed in this paper, most of these 
policy instruments are available to the administrators of disability pro 
grams. In this respect, European policy approaches are similar. Cross 
country differences in policy outcomes, therefore, cannot be explained 
by a lack of tools. The dominant view in Europe, nowadays also shared
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by traditional supporters of the welfare state in Sweden and the Nether 
lands, is that the incentive structure implied by the design of national 
disability policies is crucially inadequate. To illustrate this argument, 
we will identify the major agents involved in shaping disability prac 
tices and the ways in which their behavior is affected by the implicit 
incentive structure.
Who Are the Agents?
The allocation of disability benefits over the population at risk takes 
place through the operation of three agents: (1) insured/covered per 
sons, mainly employees, who can claim to be unfit for work because of 
a physical or mental impairment; (2) their employers, if any, who either 
may support the claim, or, if held responsible, fight it, or may help in 
overcoming the limiting consequences of functional impairments; and 
(3) the intermediaries, i.e., private or social insurers and the curative 
sector, which have to assess the extent to which claimants are eligible 
and to which their ailments can be cured or their limitations can be 
overcome.
Each of these three agents is subject to incentives determining the 
outcome of a process that starts with the manifestation of the symp 
toms of an ailment. These incentives are primarily defined by the 
design of the plans covering disability-related needs. For instance, 
stringent, and easily and unambiguously applicable, eligibility rules for 
disability (cash) benefits restrict the discretion of both the gatekeepers 
of the disability plan and the persons covered. On the other hand, dis 
ability eligibility rules that encompass every conceivable health com 
plaint leave a great deal of latitude both to gatekeepers in their 
disability determinations and, hence, to covered persons in weighing 
the costs and benefits of program participation.
The greater the room for choice, the stronger the impact of other 
than health-related factors. Such factors may be program characteris 
tics—benefit size and duration, availability of curative, corrective, or 
rehabilitative provisions in kind, mandated redeployment—or may be 
more or less independent of the design and operation of the disability 
plan. These external influences can be found in different spheres of 
life—personal, vocational, social—of the individuals covered by the 
program. These factors, however, may also stem from a broader envi-
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ronment, such as regional labor market circumstances and the avail 
ability of alternative cash benefits. 8
The Employee/Disability Beneficiary
Economic theory posits that workers supply labor according to their 
preferences with regard to the trade-off between leisure and earnings, 
available nonwork income, and earning capacities as reflected by wage 
rates. The stronger one's taste for leisure, the lower the expected wage 
rate, and the larger the amount of nonwork income, the smaller the 
expected number of hours supplied. The expected wage rate is the 
product of the wage rate in a given job and the probability of finding 
such a job, taken over all jobs in the relevant segment of the labor mar 
ket, i.e., the wage offer distribution. Similarly, the expected number of 
hours is the product of the probability of labor force participation and 
the preferred number of hours, given participation.
Within this theoretical framework, health impairments may reduce 
labor supply for two reasons. Impairments affect the demand for lei 
sure positively and, depending on the extent of disablement, have a 
negative impact on the expected wage rate, both by reducing the earn 
ing capacity in a given job and by lowering the mean of the wage offer 
distribution. The negative effect of a lower wage on labor supplied may 
be reinforced by disability-related income transfers that replace part of 
the earnings loss. The relevant concept is the expected benefit as a 
function of award stringency and the benefit stream upon award.
In the absence of mandatory rehabilitation and regular reviews of 
disability status, eligible workers can choose between permanent with 
drawal from the labor force, by enrollment in a disability insurance 
plan, or reentry into the workforce, by, if necessary, enrollment in a 
rehabilitation program. As described in the preceding two sections, the 
Dutch disability insurance system typically offers such discretion to 
workers who are recognized as disabled. Under the German and British 
programs, benefit dependency is much less of an option. There, the sta 
tus of being severely disabled is allowed to keep people in employment 
instead of making them redundant.
Our research on the determinants of disability benefit recipiency in 
the Netherlands strongly confirms the influence of economic factors on 
the choice between benefit dependency and work resumption. We 
found that medical factors, such as the nature and extent of disable-
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ment and health history, explain only about one-third of the variation in 
the probability of entry into the disability insurance benefit system. Of 
the remaining, nonmedical factors, financial considerations, indicated 
by the present value of the benefit stream relative to the present value 
of the expected stream of earnings upon work resumption, and unem 
ployment hazards derived from labor market records have proved to be 
particularly influential (see Aarts and de long 1992, pp. 299-303).
Despite stricter systems in the United States and the United King 
dom, similar results have been found in studies of these countries (see 
Leonard 1986 and Aylward and Lonsdale 1992). These findings sug 
gest that an inherently vague concept like work disability always 
allows some room for discretion. Given the availability and generosity 
of disability benefits, eligible workers with no (further) career pros 
pects and a weak labor market position appear to prefer benefit depen 
dency rather than returning to the hazards of labor market 
participation. The results also imply that an increase in award strin 
gency and/or a reduction in benefit generosity may boost the demand 
for rehabilitative services. In Sweden, disability benefit replacement 
rates are relatively high; however, sick pay is even higher, and the 
incentive is to extend the sickness period. With no statutory limits on 
the length of sickness benefit entitlements, the sickness benefit pro 
gram has many beneficiaries who would be considered disabled under 
the Dutch ruling. Vocational rehabilitation is stimulated by entitling 
participants to 100 percent benefits. By paying market wages in shel 
tered employment, the interest in reemployment is increased in a simi 
lar way. Empirical evidence suggests that the modest size of the 
disability populations in Germany (except older workers) and the 
United Kingdom is to some extent the result of relatively low benefit 
replacement rates in these countries.
The Employer
Employers are agents who affect disability policy in two ways. First, 
they can directly influence the incidence of work injuries and occupa 
tional diseases. Second, by offering job opportunities to functionally 
impaired employees or to disabled people from outside the firm, 
employers may contribute to reducing disability benefit dependency.
Workers can be gainfully employed only as long as the value of their 
productivity covers labor costs. Thus, impaired workers with reduced
154 European Experiences with Disability Policy
productivity must be employed in jobs with wages that are substan 
tially below their pre-impairment level, or in jobs where profitability 
requirements are less pressing, such as public sector employment in 
general and sheltered work in particular. Private employers can make 
jobs available to the functionally impaired only if a positive difference 
between wages and the (marginal) revenue deriving from this labor is 
covered in one, or more, of the following ways: increased productivity 
through vocational rehabilitation, partial benefits or disability allow 
ances for diabled workers, or wage subsidies for employers.
A cost-benefit framework may help to unravel the determinants of 
the firm's willingness to engage in rehabilitation via accommodating 
workplaces or offering alternative employment. In the short run, given 
the enterprise's technology and the level of safety provision, the net 
cost for the employer of an employee entering a disability transfer pro 
gram primarily depends on the profitability of the job held by the 
impaired worker. Clearly, the incentive to retain an impaired employee 
will be very small if the individual's job is redundant. This is one of the 
reasons why disability transfer payments increase in times of growing 
unemployment. If the job is not redundant, enrollment into a disability 
benefit program means hiring a replacement. The cost-benefit approach 
implies that a firm's inclination to retain and rehabilitate workers who 
have become functionally impaired depends on the following:
• The value of the impaired employee's productivity. The higher the 
postadjustment productivity, the more inclined the firm will be to 
accommodate and retain the worker.
•The labor costs of continued employment of the employee. By 
allowing for subsidies covering part of these costs, the disability 
program may encourage firms to retain workers upon impairment.
•The costs of adjustments, net of subsidies, to make jobs and 
impaired workers match. Lowering these costs may reinforce a 
firm's inclination to retain impaired employees.
• The potential contribution of a replacement to the firm's proceeds. 
Other things equal, the higher the expected productivity of a 
replacement employee, the less inclined the firm will be to retain 
and accommodate the impaired worker.
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• The cost of recruiting and training a replacement. Firms will be 
more inclined to retain employees after the occurrence of func 
tional impairments if the individuals' skills are hard to find. If a 
replacement would need to go through a long period of job or firm- 
specific training to acquire the impaired employee's skills, replace 
ment may be an unattractive alternative. Equally important, finding 
a suitable replacement in a tight labor market may involve consid 
erable search costs. In this situation, external labor market condi 
tions enter the cost-benefit calculus.
• The costs of enrolling an employee into the disability insurance 
program and the internal and external financial consequences of 
program enrollment. The higher these costs, the greater the firm's 
inclination to retain functionally impaired employees. Insurance 
devices, such as coinsurance and differentiation of contribution 
rates (experience rating), raise the cost-consciousness of firms with 
respect to these external expenses.
The countries reviewed have different approaches to the firm. Until 
recently, Swedish and Dutch firms did not incur any substantial cost if 
employees entered the disability rolls. Mandatory employment quotas 
still are absent, and contribution rates are uniform, although differenti 
ation is under consideration. In both of these countries, program 
administrators have had a range of instruments at their disposal to help 
bridge the gap between impaired employees' productivity and market 
wages: fully subsidized training and rehabilitation, fully subsidized job 
accommodation provisions, and partial disability benefit entitlements. 
As mentioned, the effect has been very limited in these two nations.
Since 1987, both Sweden and the Netherlands have taken measures 
to remove adverse incentives and to introduce alternatives to benefit 
dependency. Between 1980 and 1987, benefit levels had already been 
cut. After that, the focus shifted from the employee to the employer, 
with measures affecting the cost to the firm of disability program 
enrollment and the benefit of retaining or hiring functionally impaired 
workers. In the Netherlands, a stick-and-carrot mechanism was intro 
duced that puts a fine on every disability benefit award and provides a 
bonus for every newly hired functionally impaired employee. In the 
sickness benefit program, both in Sweden and the Netherlands, the 
employer has been made accountable for providing benefits during the
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first six (Holland) or eight weeks (Sweden). Additionally, in the Neth 
erlands, legislation was put in place by which employers are obligated 
to make the accommodations necessary to employ functionally 
impaired employees. As these measures did not bring about the 
intended effects quickly enough, benefit levels were further reduced in 
1993.
It would be unfair, however, to put all the blame on the employer. A 
provision enacted in 1986 empowering impaired workers in Holland 
with a legal instrument to enforce (subsidized) workplace accommoda 
tion did not have any impact on the claims for in-kind entitlements. 
Only a few cases were brought to court. This is indicative, not only of 
the apparent preference of Dutch disability benefit claimants for leav 
ing the labor market, but also of the lax assessment procedures that 
allow claimants to act according to their preferences.
Germany and the United Kingdom have had a quota system for 
many years, although enforcement is weak, especially in Britain. Dis 
abled employment is more substantial than in Sweden or the Nether 
lands, however. In Germany, the registered disabled account for over 4 
percent of total employment. In the United Kingdom, this figure may 
be lower; but considering the huge difference in the sizes of the British 
and Dutch disabled populations relative to the labor force and the small 
differences, if any, in unemployment rates, it appears that many func 
tionally impaired British citizens, who would have been entitled to dis 
ability benefits under the Dutch system, are gainfully employed.
The Administering Organizations
The extent to which individual preferences or firm-specific consid 
erations have an impact on the number of disability beneficiaries 
depends on the behavior of the gatekeepers of disability insurance pro 
grams. Whether or not firms are successful in discharging impaired 
employees by making them apply for disability benefits depends on 
whether benefit dependency conforms with the preferences of the 
employee and the design and administration of the program. A 
leniently administered, and generous, disability insurance regime pro 
vides older workers with an early retirement option and offers firms 
ample opportunities to use disability insurance as an instrument for 
personnel management. Ideally, the adverse stimuli for employers and 
employees to "play the disability insurance system" should be counter-
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balanced by administrative regulations and routines that either reduce 
the discretionary powers of individual employers and employees or 
provide contrary incentives. To do this, administering organizations 
need adequate instrumentation, for example, standardized assessment 
and review protocols and the authority to enforce compliance with 
quotas and to prescribe and mandate rehabilitation. The administration 
also needs the motivation to apply the available instruments ade 
quately.
While private insurance carriers get their incentive from a competi 
tive market environment, public services require either bureaucratic 
control mechanisms or budget containment of some sort. In the four 
European countries, disability insurance is publicly administered, but 
there are significant differences in administrative design. In the United 
Kingdom, the government bears direct responsibility for administra 
tion. The Department of Social Security allocates the benefits, and the 
Department of Employment administers the job programs. Careful 
allocation of benefits is safeguarded by combining bureaucratic and 
budget controls. In the Netherlands, on the other hand, the government, 
until 1995, had only indirect administrative responsibilities since the 
actual administration and its supervision and control were delegated to 
semipublic organizations run by employers' and union representatives 
(the so-called social partners). 9 Bureaucratic controls were weak, and 
budget containment devices were virtually absent. The German and 
Swedish administrations are somewhere in between those of the Neth 
erlands and the United Kingdom. Germany is closer to the Netherlands 
in its approach, as it allows some influence from labor and manage 
ment, be it under strict government control. In Sweden, the system is 
closer to that of the United Kingdom; Swedish benefits are adminis 
tered by government agencies, while the social partners only have a say 
in the provision of employment services. In both Germany and Swe 
den, the administrative system is closely monitored by the government.
Put in terms of a "principal agent scheme," with government as the 
principal and the administrative system as the agent, most European 
governments try to monitor the agents as closely as possible, so that 
social disability insurance is administered according to the public 
interest. In Holland, the agents, in casu, the social partners have had 
ample opportunities to serve their own interests, yielding to the prefer 
ences of their membership in times of economic recession and struc-
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tural economic changes. As a consequence, nothing was done to 
counterbalance the adverse incentives of a lenient award policy on 
individual employers and employees. The result has been the two- 
decade-long sustained process of purging the labor force of marginally 
productive workers.
Lessons from Europe
In the 1980s, the need to cut back public expenditures led to the 
reevaluation of social insurance policies all over Europe. Initially, the 
focus was on the efficacy of social security programs. Measures were 
taken, for example, to improve the possibilities for timely intervention 
in order to reduce disability insurance dependency, to disentangle the 
unemployment and disability components in disability insurance, and 
to increase job opportunities by making workplace adjustment manda 
tory and by introducing quota legislation. In more recent years, when 
earlier policy adjustments appeared to be less effective than hoped for, 
the focus gradually shifted away from technical changes towards mea 
sures intended to restructure the incentives induced by social security 
systems. Especially in Sweden and the Netherlands, these incentive 
issues have been, and still are, heavily debated.
In Germany and the United Kingdom, the incentive structure is 
much less of a problem. In both of these countries, the private sector 
employment opportunities for people with disabilities are larger than in 
Sweden or Holland. These higher participation rates probably result 
from an administrative system that operates more efficiently and effec 
tively and from benefit rates in Germany and, especially, Britain that, 
by their modesty, may spur preferences for work over transfer depen 
dency. Under these stricter systems, the social costs of disability are 
likely to be lower and, to a larger extent, borne by private enterprises 
and households.
Currently, the operations of the third agent, the Social Security 
Administration, are the major object of policy reform in Holland. In 
1993, a parliamentary commission officially concluded what an 
increasing number of observers already had suspected—that the 
administering organizations had grossly failed in achieving an efficient
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and effective allocation of social insurance resources. Now the debate 
on the social security system—on the concept of the welfare state, for 
that matter—is completely open. The proposals put forward range 
from total privatization of social insurance to full socialization under 
government control.
Similar developments can be observed in Sweden, the prototype of 
the welfare state. The general feeling is that government has reached 
the limits of what it can provide or even should want to provide. In 
contemporary societies, people are viewed as autonomous citizens, 
aware of their individual interests, and ready to act in response to these 
needs. In such an environment, where public authority is no longer 
obvious, workers, employers, and administrators have become less 
hesitant to respond to the incentives with which they are confronted.
Good social policy and practice, then, not only require able adminis 
trators, using appropriate policy tools, but an intelligent design of the 
incentive structures implied both by the programs and by their manage 
ment. This may seem obvious, but it took about three decades before 
this insight finally broke through among European supporters of the 
welfare state.
Appendix Table. Disability Policies in Four European Countries
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Potentially strong, weak in 
practice
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Mainly pnvate sector, 
moderately significant
Disability Working Allowance 
Not enforced quota regulation
None
Moderate
SOURCE. Based on data published in Aarts, Burkhauser, and de Jong (1996) and U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, SSA (1994).
a. Means-tested benefits payable to disabled people with a job.
b Continued benefit entitlements while at work on probation or participating in a rehabilitation program
c Rehabilitation program participants receive 90 percent of lost earnings
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NOTES
1. A practical consideration for choosing these four countries is that their disability policies 
are relatively well documented in the international literature, recently, for instance, in Bloch 1993
2. For additional details, see U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Social Security 
Administration (1994)
3. See National Academy of Social Insurance (1994), p. 38
4 A similar early retirement option applies to employees who were unemployed for at least 
one year in the 18 months before age 60.
5. See, for instance, Lando et al. (1979) and Disney and Webb (1991)
6 Further legislation was enacted in 1986, through the Handicapped Workers' Employment 
Act (WAGW). The WAGW contains an additional budget to adapt job demands and working con 
ditions to the functional limitations of impaired employees Spending under WAGW is similarly 
low
7. Quoted from "Social Security in Sweden How to Reform the System," Report to the Expert 
Group on Public Finance, Ministry of Finance, Stockholm, 1994, p 7
8 For a fuller treatment of the determinants of disability benefit recipiency, see Aarts and de 
Jong (1992, chapter 3)
9 As of 1995, supervision of benefit administration is in the hands of an independent agency 
The current government proposes privatization of both the sickness benefit and the disability 
insurance schemes.
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